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AIR CARRIER LIABILITY UNDER DEREGULATION
CALVIN DAVISON* AND DAVID H. SOLOMON**
I. INTRODUCTION
C LAIMS BY PASSENGERS against air carriers relating
to baggage, overbooking (oversales), and delayed or
cancelled flights, and the ability of carriers to limit their lia-
bility for these and similar harms, has been determined pri-
marily in the context of a system of federal statutory and
regulatory law.' As of January 1, 1983, much of this statu-
tory/regulatory system, including the domestic tariff system,
ceased to exist.2
This article examines in detail the substantive liability
rules that will govern in this deregulated environment and
the manner in which carriers will be permitted to avoid or
limit their liability for the sorts of harms listed above. Section
II provides an overview of the tariff system and the changes
that its elimination will engender. Section III examines the
applicable substantive law, while Section IV discusses notice
requirements. Section V provides some concluding remarks
about what possibly lies ahead.
The impact of deregulation in the area of carrier terms and
conditions of carriage is likely to be dramatic. While Civil
Aeronautics Board ("Board" or "CAB") and treaty regula-
tion will continue in certain discrete areas, carriers will no
* Mr. Davison, a 1959 graduate of the Harvard Law School, is a partner at Crowell
& Moring, Washington D.C.
** Mr. Solomon, a 1981 graduate of the Harvard Law School, is an associate at
Crowell & Moring.
I See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § § 1373 & 1374 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (relating to tariffs, safe
and adequate service, and non-preferential treatment).
49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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longer be protected by the domestic tariff system. The rela-
tionship between carriers and their passengers will be gov-
erned to a much greater extent by the common law and state
statutes. Carriers will have to adapt to a new era of contrac-
tual relations and increased disclosure. Carriers will almost
certainly face more litigation and probably an increase in lia-
bility as well.
II. THE DOMESTIC TARIFF SYSTEM AND ITS
ELIMINATION
A. The Domestic Tarff'System
Section 403 of the Federal Aviation Act ("Act") required
air carriers to file with the CAB detailed tariffs setting forth,
znter ah'a, their "classifications, rules, regulations, practices,
and services."' 3 The Act gave the CAB power to require cer-
tain information to be included in tariffs and to reject tariffs
not in conformity with such requirements. The Board used
this authority to promulgate detailed and extensive tariff reg-
ulations,5 including the prescription or proscription of liabil-
ity limitation rules.6
A valid domestic tariff, once on file with the CAB, gov-
erned the rights and liabilities of the air carrier and its pas-
sengers,7 either because it became part of the contract of
carriage or as a matter of federal law.8 Provisions of the tariff,
49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Id
14 C.F.R. § 221 (1982). These tariff regulations take up 87 pages in the Code of
Federal Regulations.
'i For example, the Board's tariff rules established certain notice requirements for
carriers that limited their baggage liability, 14 C.F.R. § 221.176 (1982), and prohibited
carriers from instituting time limitations on the bringing of suits for personal injury or
death. 14 C.F.R. § 221.38(h) (1982).
' See, e.g., Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, 544 F.2d 134 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 915 (1977); Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, 413 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir.
1969); Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, 541 F. Supp. 1338 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Mao v.
Eastern Air Lines, 310 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
" Compare Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, 544 F.2d 134 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 915 (1977) with Blair v. Delta Air Lines, 344 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Fla. 1972),
af'd, 477 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1973). For extensive citation of cases following each theory,
see North American Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229, 233 (2d
Cir. 1978).
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including limitations of liability, governed even if not men-
tioned in the contract of carriage.9 The CAB generally had
primary jurisdiction over cases relating to tariff rules."°
B. Related Statutory Provisions
The Act also gave the CAB specific authority to regulate
air carrier practices. Section 411, for example, permitted the
Board to order carriers to cease and desist from "unfair or
deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition."'"
Section 1002 gave it authority to prescribe carrier rules, regu-
lations or practices if those of particular carriers were "unjust
or unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly prefer-
ential. 1 2 Under its general authority to enforce the provi-
sions of the Act, 13 the Board also had authority to ensure that
carriers (1) "provide safe and adequate service,"14 (2) "estab-
lish, observe, and enforce .. .just and reasonable classifica-
tions, rules, regulations, and practices,"' 5 and (3) do not
provide any "undue or unreasonable preference or advan-
tage" or subject anyone to "unjust discrimination or any un-
due or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect
whatsoever.' 6 The Board used an amalgamation of these
provisions as authority for imposing substantive requirements
in such areas as oversales"7 and smoking.1 8
" See supra note 8; see also Shortley v. Northwestern Airlines, 104 F. Supp. 152, 155
(D.D.C. 1952) (the filing of a tariff constituted "constructive notice" of its provisions).
" See, e.g., Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951). But compare
Odom v. Pacific Northern Airlines, Inc., 393 P.2d 112 (Alaska 1964). For general dis-
cussion of the tariff system, see Albert, Lt'mitations on Air Carrier Liabiliy: An Inadvertent
Return to Common Law Principles, 48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 111, 112-127 (1983); Pratt, Tariff
Limi'tatzons on Air Carriage Contracts, 29 J. AIR L. & CoM. '4 (1963).
49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Id § 1482(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
Id. § 1324 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
14 Id. § 1374(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Id.
w Id. § 1374(b) (1976).
17 14 C.F.R. § 250 (1982).
" 14 C.F.R. § 252 (1982).
1983]
34 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
C. Deregulation and Remainng Board Authority
The Airline Deregulation Act of 197819 drastically changed
this regulatory environment. It eliminated, as of January 1,
1983, the domestic tariff system.20 It also eliminated, as of the
same date, the Board's authority to prescribe carrier rules
and practices in order to eliminate unjust, unreasonable, un-
justly discriminatory, or unduly preferential practices.21 Simi-
larly, as of January 1, 1983, the Board lost its authority to
ensure just and reasonable rules and practices and to protect
against preferential or discriminatory treatment.22 The only
remaining authority that the Board has over carrier rules and
practices is thus to ensure "safe and adequate" service and to
protect against unfair or deceptive practices or unfair meth-
ods of competition.23
The impact of the elimination of tariffs will be dramatic.
Carriers will no longer be able to protect themselves or limit
their liability merely by filing a valid tariff. Tariffs will no
longer have "the force and effect of law," and will not limit
liability "in any way. ' '24
While, as discussed below, some Board regulation contin-
ues to exist in the area of carrier terms and conditions, carri-
ers now face the possibility of extensive regulation by the
common law and by state statutes, with different rules gov-
erning in different states. The loss of tariff protection will al-
most certainly result in an increase of suits against carriers
and probably in an increase in liability as well. The elimina-
tion of the related sources of CAB authority over carrier rules
and practices will probably not have a substantial impact on
liability issues. Authority to ensure safe and adequate service
and to protect against unfair and deceptive practices is being
broadly interpreted so as to sustain the Board's exercise of
Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
21 Id. § 1551(a)(2)(D).
2 Id. § 1551(a)(2)(B).
Id § 1551(a)(2)(D).
Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Barnes Elec., 540 F. Supp. 640, 641 (N.D. Ind. 1982)
(involving elimination of air cargo tariffs).
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authority in such traditional regulatory areas as smoking,
baggage and oversales.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia and Fifth Circuits, for example, recently held that the
Board has authority to regulate smoking under the "adequate
service" provision of the Act. 5 More generally, both courts
held that the "adequate service" provision should be read
broadly to give the Board authority to regulate the "quality
of service" provided by carriers, and that this authority was
specifically retained by the Airline Deregulation Act.2 6 As the
D.C. Circuit stated:
Legislative history indicates that the desired reform was not
aimed at regulation of quality of service, but at the certifica-
tion procedure that had retarded entry into the industry, ex-
pansion of service, and competition over fares. There is
absolutely no indication of congressional intent to remove the
Board's authority to regulate smoking. Thus, although the
Deregulation Act reflected a congressional desire to rely more
heavily on competition, it did not disturb Board authority to
regulate quality of service. 27
While other courts may take a more restrictive view, espe-
cially if the Board enters new regulatory areas, the Board will
likely be able to continue to regulate carrier rules and prac-
tices in discrete areas. Whether, where, and to what degree
such regulation will survive ultimate CAB "sunset," presently
scheduled for January 1, 1985, will depend on further legisla-




Through its tariff authority,28 which expired January 1,
21 Action on Smoking and Health v. CAB, 699 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Defenthal v. CAB, 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1982), appealpending.
21 Id.
21 Action on Smoking and Health, 699 F.2d at 1214-15 (footnote omitted).
- 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see also 14 C.F.R. § 298.95 (1982).
1983]
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1983,29 the CAB regulated the domestic and overseas (i.e.,
within United States territory) baggage policies of certifi-
cated air carriers. Carriers filing tariffs were required not to
limit their baggage liability to an amount less than $750.30
In order to establish rules for the carriage of baggage in
interstate and overseas air transportation after January 1,
1983, the CAB adopted a new part 254 of its regulations,
which was to have been effective on February 22, 1983. 3' On
February 8, 1983, however, in response to a petition of the
Air Transport Association to repeal the rules, the Board
stayed the effective date of the new part 254, and ordered
that the existing rules, without their tariff filing requirements,
remain in effect until further notice.32 In April 1983, the
Board issued a new notice of Proposed Rulemaking on part
254, requesting comments on whether (a) the minimum lia-
bility limit should be raised to $1,000 or $1,250, (b) any car-
rier, regardless of aircraft size, should be required to adhere
to this limit for all flight segments included on the same ticket
with a large-carrier segment, and (c) excess valuation cover-
age should be required.
2. Oversales/Overbookng
Under part 250 of its Regulations, 34 the CAB regulates the
49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
47 Fed. Reg. 52,987 (1982) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 254).
Id. at 52,987-91. The new rules would have applied to chartered or scheduled
passenger service involving aircraft with a maximum capacity of more than 60 seats.
Carriers operating 60 seat or less aircraft, whether certificated or not, would have been
exempted from the rules. Presently, only uncertificated carriers operating such aircraft
are exempt from the rules. The new rules provided that a carrier could not limit to less
than $1,000 per passenger its liability for the disappearance of, damage to, or delay in
delivery of, a passenger's personal property, including baggage, which was in the car-
rier's custody. In addition, the rules set forth notice requirements for limitation of bag-
.gage liability, discussed in Section IV(A)(l), infla notes 155-164 and accompanying
text.
:12 48 Fed. Reg. 6698 (1983).
m 48 Fed. Reg. 22,323 (1983). The Board also proposed new notice requirements,
discussed in Section IV(A)(l), infra notes 155-164 and accompanying text. The Board
offered its proposal to cover certain segments involving small aircraft as an alternative
to the new notice requirement, which would state that small carriers may have lower
liability limits. The two proposals are thus mutually exclusive.
:" 14 C.F.R. § 250 (1982), amended, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,980 (1982).
AIR CARRIER LIABILITY
overbooking policies of carrier operations with aircraft of
more than 60 seats within the United States or its possessions
or territories and those flights in foreign air transportation
which originate at a point within the United States. Recent
CAB modifications of these rules, effective January 23, 1983,
indicate the CAB's intent to continue regulation in this
area.
3 5
For those operations to which it applies, part 250, as modi-
fied, requires carriers to follow certain specified procedures if
they have oversold a flight. In the event of an oversold flight,
carriers are required first to request volunteers to accept will-
ingly an offer of compensation, in any amount, in exchange
for relinquishing their reserved space. 6 If an insufficient
number of volunteers come forward, the carrier may deny
boarding to other passengers in accordance with its boarding
priority rules, which it is required to have established.3 7
Part 250 requires carriers to compensate passengers who
are involuntarily denied boarding (i.e., who do not volunteer
to relinquish their space) unless (a) the passenger has not
presented himself for carriage at the appropriate time or
place and has not complied fully with the Carrier's require-
ments as to ticketing, check-in, and reconfirmation proce-
dures; (b) denied boarding is required for operational or
safety reasons; (c) the passenger is offered accommodations or
is seated in another section of the aircraft at no additional
charge (or with a refund if a lower fare is charged for that
section); or (d) the carrier arranges comparable transporta-
tion which is "planned to arrive" at the passenger's next stop
or final destination within one hour after the scheduled arri-
val time of the passenger's original flight or flights.38
Compensation to passengers involuntarily denied boarding
is to be paid at the rate of 200 percent of the sum of the value
of the passenger's remaining flight coupons up to the passen-
ger's next stopover, or, if none, to the passenger's final desti-
x, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,980 (1982).
:,, 14 C.F.R. § 250.2b (1982), amended, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,980 (1982).
17 Id. §§ 250.2b, 250.3.
m Id. §§ 250.5, 250.6.
1983]
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nation, with a $400 maximum. 9 These amounts are halved if
the carrier arranges comparable transportation that is
"planned to arrive" at the passenger's next stop, or, if none,
at his or her final destination, within two hours of the
planned arrival time in the case of interstate and overseas
(i.e., within the United States and its territories) transporta-
tion or four hours in the case of foreign air transportation.4 °
The Board has recently codified an exemption which permits
carriers to offer free or reduced rate air transportation in lieu
of the required cash amount, provided the passenger agrees
and the value of the transportation is equal to or greater than
the cash payment otherwise required. ", A "bumped" passen-
ger need not accept the compensation mandated under part
250. Rather, "the passenger may decline the payment and
seek to recover damages in a court of law or in some other
manner."42 Part 250 also requires that notice of overbooking
policies be provided to passengers,4 3 as discussed below in
Section IV(A) (2).
3. Smoking
Under part 252 of its Regulations, the Board regulates
smoking aboard aircraft designed to have a capacity of more
than 30 seats.44 Until recently, these rules required only that
carriers designate no-smoking areas and provide no-smoking
seats to passengers on request.45 In January 1983, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
vacated the Board's recission of its prior, more stringent pro-
visions requiring (a) special segregation of cigar and pipe
smokers, (b) a ban on smoking when ventilation systems are
not fully functioning, and (c) protections against non-smokers
:., Id. § 250.6.
40 Id.
4 48 Fed. Reg. 29,678 (1983) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 250). The Board has
also eliminated the references to domestic tariffs in part 250, in accordance with the
elimination of its domestic tariff authority.
- 14 C.F.R. § 250.9 (1981), amended 47 Fed. Reg. 52,987 (1982). See, e.g., Mortimer
v. Delta Airlines, 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
4:' 14 C.F.R. §§ 250.9, 250.11 (1981).
44 14 C.F.R. § 252 (1982).
- Id § 252.2.
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being "unreasonably burdened" by breathing smoke (e.g., by
the "sandwiching" of non-smoking sections between, or
across the aisles from, smoking sections).46 In response to the
court's order vacating its decision, the CAB reinstated the
rules requiring segregation of cigar and pipe smokers and re-
garding ventilation systems. 47 Despite the court's order how-
ever, the Board reaffirmed its rejection of the "unreasonably
burdened" provision.48 The court then explicitly ordered the
CAB to republish that provision, which it has done. 50
In addition, the court held that the Board had not justified
its rejection of three proposed additional rules, and it re-
manded to the Board for further consideration several rules:
(a) banning smoking on aircraft with 30 seats or less, (b) ban-
ning smoking on short flights, and (c) requiring carriers to
provide special protections for persons unusually susceptible
to the ill effects of breathing smoke.5' In response to the re-
mand portion of the court's order, the CAB first reaffirmed its
decision not to ban smoking on short flights. 52 But later the
CAB proposed to (a) ban smoking on small aircraft (defined
alternatively as aircraft of 30 seats or less or 60 seats or less),
(b) require special protections for passengers especially sensi-
tive to smoke, (c) ban cigar and pipe smoking aboard aircraft,
(d) revise the ventilation rule to ban smoking whenever the
ventilation system on aircraft is not operating as designed to
produce adequate ventilation (or, alternatively, ban all smok-
ing when a ventilation system has been turned off for any
reason).53 As a further alternative in this rulemaking, the
CAB is considering whether to exempt aircraft of 60 seats or
- Action on Smoking and Health v. CAB, 699 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The
court found the Board's justification in rescinding these rules to be "palpably inade-
quate." Id. at 1217.
41 48 Fed. Reg. 24,866 (1983).
48 Id.
49 Action on Smoking and Health v. CAB, Nos. 79-1044, 79-1095, 79-1754 and 81-
203 ( D.C. Cir. June 30, 1983).
- CAB SUNSHINE MEETING, July 27, 1983.
Action on Smoking and Health v. CAB, 699 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
48 Fed. Reg. 24,866 (1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 43,341 (1983).
id at 24,918.
19831
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less from its smoking rules.54
Currently, there are no Board requirements relating to no-
tice of smoking rules. The Board has proposed, however, that
those carriers covered by the smoking rules provide notice of
their rules on or with their tickets. 55 This proposed notice re-
quirement is discussed below in Section IV(A)(3).
B. Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement
1. Baggage
The Warsaw Convention 56 provides that carriers are liable
for destruction or loss of or damage to any checked baggage
or any goods of passengers in international travel, or on do-
mestic segments of an international journey, 57 where the bag-
gage or goods were "in the charge of the carrier." 58 A carrier
will not be subject to baggage liability under the Convention
if it proves that it took "all necessary measures" to avoid the
damage or that it was "impossible for it to take such meas-
ures."59 This "necessary measures" requirement may not be
as strict in practice as it appears on its face. One court, for
- Id at 24,919.
47 Fed. Reg. 52,190 (1982) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 252, 253).
The Warsaw Convention, formally the Convention for Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, is a multilateral
treaty, drafted and adhered to by most countries whose airlines have international
routes. The Convention standardizes various liability and notice rules involving inter-
national travel and domestic segments of international journeys. See 49 Stat. 3000, T.
S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934), reprintedat 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Convention]. For a general overview of the Convention, see In re Aircrash
in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
5,7 As the CAB has recognized, the Convention "applies to wholly domestic segments
of a "through" international journey, even where the carrier performing the domestic
segment neither performs, nor is authorized to engage in, foreign air transportation."
48 Fed. Reg. 8,043 (1983) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 203). Indeed, as the Board has
recognized, the Convention may be applied to connecting successive carriage, even
where double ticketing is involved, "if it has been regarded by the parties as a single
operation." Convention, supra note 56 art. 1(3). Thus, while the CAB thinks it "un-
likely" that a court would find a domestic non-interlining carrier subject to the Con-
vention, it recognizes that a court "might" so find. 48 Fed. Reg. 8,043 (1983).
- Convention, supra note 56, art. 18.
-. Convention, supra note 56, art. 20. In addition, a carrier will not be subject to
liability relating to baggage or goods if it proves that the damage was caused by an
error in piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in navigation, and that, in all other
respects, the carrier took "all necessary measures to avoid the damage." Id.
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example, held that, in the context of liability for damage to
goods, the phrase cannot be read "with strict literality, but
must, rather be construed to mean all reasonable measures. '"60
Under the Convention, carriers are permitted to limit their
liability for checked baggage to a sum stated in French francs
tied to a specified gold convertibility standard, unless the pas-
senger declares a higher value and pays a supplementary
sum, in which case the carrier will be liable to pay an amount
not exceeding the declared value, assuming that it is not
higher than the actual value at the time of delivery.6 1 While
the CAB has stated that, in American dollars, the limits are
"approximately" $9.07 per pound for checked baggage and
$400 per passenger for unchecked baggage, 62 the recent deci-
sion in Frankhn Mtnt Corp. v. Trans World Airlnes, 63 suggests
that these limits may be unenforceable in United States
courts.
If a carrier can prove contributory negligence, it may be
exonerated from liability for baggage or goods, in whole or in
part, in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction where the
case is tried.64 Carriers may not take advantage of any of
these liability limitation provisions if the damage to the bag-
gage was caused by their own "wilful misconduct."65 There
is, according to one court, "no dispute as to what constitutes
wilful misconduct," at least in the context of a suit for per-
sonal injury or death:
- Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, 429 F. Supp. 964, 967
(S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 573 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original). The court noted
that a carrier cannot be expected to "have taken every precaution literally necessary to
the prevention of loss," but that taking merely "some" reasonable measures would be
insufficient. Id. But see Grey v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956),dzscussedinfia note 70 and accompanying text, in which the
court adopts a more stringent interpretation of the same provision in the context of
personal injury and death liability limitations.
Convention, supra note 56, art. 22.
14 C.F.R. § 221.176 (1982), amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 227 (1983), corrected,'48 Fed.
Reg. 3,584 (1983).
" Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), appeal
pending. The implications of this case are discussed in Section III B(4), infira notes 83-91
and accompanying text. See also In re Aircrash at Kimpo International Airport, Korea,
558 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
Convention, supra note 56, art. 21.
" Convention, supra note 56, art. 25.
1983]
42 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
[Wilful misconduct is] proof of a conscious intent to do or
omit doing an act from which harm results to another, or an
intentional omission of a manifest duty. There must be a real-
ization of the probability of injury from the conduct, and a
disregard of the probable consquences of such conduct.6 6
In order to take advantage of the Warsaw Convention's
baggage liability limitation provisions, a carrier must provide
notice in accordance with the Convention's notice provisions
(as implemented by the CAB), 67 discussed below in Section
IV(B)(1).
2. Personal Injuy and Death
The Warsaw Convention provides that carriers are liable
for personal injury or death suffered by a passenger if caused
by an accident in international travel or on a domestic seg-
ment of an international journey which "took place on board
the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of em-
barking or disembarking. ' '6' The Convention permits a car-
rier to avoid its liability for personal injury or death where it
took "all necessary measures" to avoid the damage or where
it was "impossible" for it to take such measures.6 9 This phrase
has been interpreted more narrowly in this context than with
respect to baggage and goods; with respect to "most if not all
serious accidents," it creates "presumptive liability" which
"would seem to be almost if not quite insurmountable."7
While the amount to which carriers could limit their liabil-
ity under the Convention was originally set in terms of
French francs tied to a specified gold convertibility stan-
dard,7 these limits have been superceded for carriers serving
- Grey v. American Airlines, 277 F. 2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. dented, 350 U.S.
989 (1956) (citation omitted).
67 Convention, supra note 56, arts. 3, 4; 14 C.F.R. § 221.176 (1982),amended, 48 Fed.
Reg. 227 (1983), corrected, 48 Fed. Reg. 3,584 (1983).
- Convention, supra note 56, art. 17.
wl Convention, supra note 56, art. 20(i).
7 Grey v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. dented, 350 U.S.
989 (1956).
7 Convention, supra note 56, art. 22. Problems with application of the gold franc
convertibility standard have led some courts to hold its liability limitations unenforce-
able in United States courts. See supra note 63.
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the United States by the so-called Montreal Agreement.72
Under that Agreement, carriers are permitted to limit their
liability for personal injury or death to no less than $75,000 in
U.S. dollars if legal fees are included, and $58,000 if legal fees
are not included.7 3 The Montreal Agreement also elimi-
nated 74 the ability of carriers under the Warsaw Convention
to avoid or limit liability for personal injury or death if they
could prove contributory negligence.75
Under the Warsaw Convention, a carrier may not take ad-
vantage of these provisions limiting liability if the personal
injury or death was caused by its own "willful misconduct. ' 76
The United States Senate recently defeated a proposal to
eliminate this provision, in connection with a proposal to in-
crease the liability floor to at least $320,000.17 Both the War-
saw Convention and the CAB mandate that specific notice
requirements, discussed below in Section IV(B)(2), be met
before a carrier may limit its liability for personal injury or
death.78
3. Delays
The Warsaw Convention also imposes liability on carriers
"for damage occasioned by delay in the transportation by air
of passengers, baggage, or goods." 79 Such liability may be
avoided or limited if "all necessary measures" were taken or it
was impossible to take such measures8 ° or if there was con-
tributory negligence.81 A carrier will not be able to avoid or
71 CAB Agreement 18,900, E-23680 (1966), reprinted at 48 Fed. Reg. 8,045 (1983).
The CAB has recently promulgated a new part 203 of its Regulations to ensure that all
carriers serving the United States are subject to the provisions of the Montreal Agree-
ment. 48 Fed. Reg. 8,042 (1983).
" CAB Agreement 18,900, E-23680 (1966), reprinted at 48 Fed. Reg. 8,045 (1983).
,4 Id.
- Convention, supra note 56, art. 21.
,, Convention, supra note 56, art. 25. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
71 See 129 Cong. Rec. S2,279 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (necessary two-thirds ap-
proval for passage of the so-called Montreal Protocols not achieved).
7,, Convention,supra note 56, arts. 3, 4; 14 C.F.R. § 221.175 (1982),amended, 48 Fed.
Reg. 227 (1983), corrected, 48 Fed. Reg. 3,584 (1983).
79 Convention, supra note 56, art. 19.
' Convention, supra note 56, art. 20.
" Convention, supra note 56, art. 21.
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limit its liability for delays caused by its "wilful
misconduct. 82
4. Franklin Mint and the Enforceability of the Warsaw
Convention
In the Frankhn Mit case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held the Warsaw Convention's limits on lia-
bility for the loss of cargo unenforceable in the United States
courts. 3 Because the price of gold is no longer the interna-
tional monetary standard, the court held that there was no
acceptable method of converting the Convention's French
franc limitations into American dollars. To avoid substantial
hardship to carriers, it applied its decision prospectively only.
It also noted that its decision affected only the liability limita-
tion provisions of the Convention, not its liability establish-
ment provisions." The case is currently on appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.
If upheld by the Supreme Court, Franklin Mint will have a
dramatic impact on air carrier liability under the Warsaw
Convention. Carriers will no longer be able to limit their lia-
bility with respect to goods and baggage 85 under the Conven-
tion. Instead, their ability to limit such liability in
international travel (including domestic segments of interna-
tional journeys) will be determined by the common law, 6 at
least until an alternative international solution is achieved.
Frankln Mint will almost certainly not affect limitation of lia-
bility for personal injury or death in international travel to or
from the United States, however, as such liability limitations
" Convention, supra note 56, art. 25. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), appeal
pending. See also In re Aircrash at Kimpo International Airport, Korea, 558 F. Supp. 72
(C.D. Cal. 1983) (applying Franklin Mint to limitations on liability for personal injury
or death under The Warsaw Convention).
Frankh Mint, 690 F.2d at 311 n.27.
". Under the Convention, limitation of liability for baggage is also based on French
francs, so the holding of Franklin Mint would apply there as well. See supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
- See Hill v. United Airlines, 550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982) (if the Warsaw
Convention is inapplicable to a case arising out of international travel, liability will be
determined by traditional common law rules).
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are determined under the Montreal Agreement in terms of
American dollars.87
Another recent decision, In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 88
may also have an important impact on the application in
United States courts of the Warsaw Convention, as well as
the Montreal Agreement. While not deciding the question of
whether the Warsaw Convention was unconstitutional, as ar-
gued by the plaintiffs, the court did state that it "would be
constitutional under the Commerce Clause unless arbztrag or
unreasonable. "89 Demonstrating considerable hostility to the
Convention, the court, on its own motion, raised the question
of whether the Warsaw Convention's liability limits consti-
tute an unconstitutional taking of property without due pro-
cess of law, and held that "plaintiffs have a right to
compensation if their claims have been unreasonably im-
paired by the treaty. . . .90 Any such compensation would
be provided by the United States Government through litiga-
tion in the Court of Claims.9'
Even if this decision does not lead to a finding that the
Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement liability limi-
tations are unconstitutionally arbitrary or unreasonable, the
case could nevertheless seriously undermine the existing sys-
tem of liability limitation in international travel. If plaintiffs
were to begin routinely recovering money from the United
States Government as a result of limitations on their recovery
from carriers, the United States would be unlikely to stand by
the Convention and Agreement for long. While such a series
of events is highly speculative, Bali nevertheless opens up the
possibility.
1' See supra note 72 and accompanying text. But see In re Aircrash at Kimpo Interna-
tional Airport, Korea, 558 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
- 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
- Id. at 1309 (emphasis added).
I d. at 1313.
, Id.
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C. The Common Law
1. App/icabihty in General
Even under the system of pervasive federal regulation, the
common law played an important role in determining air
carrier liability for harms such as denied boarding due to
overbooking, loss of or damage to baggage, and delays or can-
cellation of flights. Section 1106 of the Federal Aviation Act
specifically provides that the Act's provisions shall not "in
any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at com-
mon law or by statute, but . . . are in addition to such reme-
dies."' 92 Federal statutory and regulatory law thus merely
supplemented, rather than replaced, common law remedies.93
Consistent with section 1106 of the Act, courts recognized,
even during the regime of extensive CAB tariff regulation,
the existence of common law actions against air carriers for
fraudulent misrepresentation in failing to disclose overbook-
ing practices,94 breach of contract for bumping due to
overbooking,95 breach of contract for loss of or damage to
baggage,96 breach of duty as a common carrier for cancelling
a flight because an airplane was diverted to another route,"
and breach of contract in making an intermediate stop on a
non-stop flight.98
The common law will continue to play a role in these ar-
eas, especially in the case of smaller carriers, to whom many
of the CAB's substantive rules do not apply.99 More funda-
mentally, the common law will replace domestic tariff regula-
,, 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976)
13 See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290 (1976). See also Gilbert v. Bagley,
492 F. Supp. 714 (M.D.N.C. 1980). In general, state and common law remedies survive
enactment of a federal statute unless "they are specifically preempted or in conflict
with the federal law." Id. at 742.
E.g., Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
Eg., Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. I1 1969).
E.g., Greenberg v. United Airlines, 98 Misc. 2d 544, 414 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Civ. Ct.
1979).
Eg., Schaefer v. National Airlines, 499 F. Supp. 920 (D. Md. 1980).
E.g., Vick v. National Airlines, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,405 (La. App. 1982).
See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text, for a discussion of rules with regard
to baggage. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of rules with
regard to oversales.
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tion by the CAB as the basic source for determination of
carrier liability.100 The common law will also fill in the gaps
created by deregulation. For example, while passengers had
been able to seek relief for denied boarding under the anti-
discrimination provisions of section 404 of the Act, °' with the
repeal of that provision, 0 2 they now will presumably have to
resort to common law remedies.
The basis for common law liability of air carriers is not
limited to cases involving air transportation. Prior to the reg-
ulation of railroads, buses, and other providers of transporta-
tion, courts developed a vast body of common law relating to
common carriers. Because the federal government has regu-
lated common carriers for so long, many of the relevant cases
are old. 103 Nevertheless, this common law of common carrier
liability is still discussed and applied by modern courts. 10 4
Given that commercial air carriers are common carriers,10 5
courts are likely to look for guidance to this general body of
common law principles as a supplement to existing common
law air carrier cases.
Once it is determined that the common law applies, a sub-
sidiary question is whether state or federal common law will
govern. Common law suits brought against air carriers in
state court almost certainly will be governed by state com-
-I See Klicker v. Northwest Airlines, 563 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1977); Fireman's Fund
Ins. Cos. v. Barnes Elec., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Ind. 1982). The ability of carriers
to set time limitations on the bringing of suits for personal injury or death, for example,
will now be governed by the common law rather than the CAB. See supra note 6; see also
Albert, supra note 10, at 134-137.
49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1976); Karp v. North Central Air Lines, 567 F.2d 290 (5th
Cir. 1978); Sabon Investments v. Braniff Airways, 534 F. Supp. 683 (D. Ariz. 1982).
49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2)(B)(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
See, e.g., Hannibal R.R. v. Swift, 79 U.S. 262 (1870). (railroad held liable as a
common carrier for damage to passenger's luggage).
"I See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134 (1964); Ensco, Inc.
v. Weicker Transfer and Storage, 689 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1982); J&H Flyer, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 316 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1963).
,-, Commercial air carriers are common carriers because they hold themselves out to
the public as willing to carry all passengers for hire indiscriminately. Arrow Aviation,
Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959); Curtiss-Wright Flying Serv. v. Close, 66
F.2d 710 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 696 (1933); Pacific Northern Airlines v. Alaska
Airlines, 80 F. Supp. 592 (D. Alaska 1948); Irwin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 17 Av.
Cas. (CCH) 17,546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
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mon law. 0 6 Given deregulation, most federal court suits
against air carriers for the types of harms discussed in this
article will be based on diversity of citizenship,'0 7 so state,
rather than federal common law can be expected to gov-
ern.1"' Indeed, most federal courts that have faced the issue
have referred to state common law.' 09 Some federal courts,
however, have suggested that federal common law applies."' 0
Application of federal law would ensure uniformity and
avoid complicated conflict of laws questions."' Another sub-
sidiary question is whether states may enact statutes modify-
ing substantive common law rules relating to air carrier
liability. Generally, states may enact statutes modifying or
abolishing common law rules," 12 and there is no reason to be-
lieve they may not do so in this field.
1 3
' See, e.g., Vick v. National Airlines, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,405 (La. App. 1982)
(air carrier breached contract when it made an unscheduled stop which caused passen-
gers to miss their connecting flight; state common law used in awarding damages);
Kalish v. Trans World Airlines, 50 Ohio St. 2d 73, 362 N.E.2d 994 (1977) (suit for
bumping controlled by state common law).
.... Federal courts had federal question jurisdiction over many claims for damages
because they arose under the tariff or anti-preferential treatment sections of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1374 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See North Ameri-
can Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1978). Given their
repeal, 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), these statutory provisions can-
not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See Wasserman v. Trans World Airlines, 632 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1980); Kutner v.
Eastern Airlines, 514 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Roman v. Delta Air Lines, 441 F.
Supp. 1160 (N.D. 11. 1977); Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. National Airlines, 413 F.
Supp. 493 (E.D. La. 1976).
,, Klicker v. Northwest Airlines, 563 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1977); Firemen's Fund Ins.
Cos. v. Barnes Elec., Inc. 540 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
.. See K/icker, 563 F.2d at 1316 n.10.
11 Gray v. Nelson, 533 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1976) (action against a county for negli-
gence in violation of statutory duties barred by statute of limitations although common
law would allow such recovery); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19 (N.D.
Ind. 1980); (common law wrongful death action barred by statute); Agristor Credit
Corp. v. Lewellen, 472 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Miss. 1979).
-1 Except for existing proprietary powers and rights, no state or political subdivision
may, however, legislate or regulate with respect to the "rates, routes, or services" of
interstate air carriers. 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). While the scope of this
provision is uncertain, it is clear that Congress intended it to "prohibit states from
exercising economic regulatory control over interstate airlines." S. REP. No. 95-631,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1978). Thus states certainly may not enact and enforce systems
of tariffs. See Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir.
1981). Statutes affecting the substantive liability of air carriers and their ability to limit
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2. Baggage
At common law, when a common carrier agrees to carry a
passenger, it also impliedly contracts to carry a reasonable
amount of that passenger's baggage.' 4 Such a common car-
rier is liable, as an znsurer, for any loss of or damage to a pas-
senger's baggage." 15 Its liability as an insurer is not absolute,
however. It is not responsible for loss of or damage to baggage
caused by an act of God, public enemy, public authority, the
passenger himself, or the nature of the baggage itself."6
A common carrier may not, at common law, exculpate itself
by contract from liability for harm caused by its negligent
acts.'" 7While the cases do not discuss exculpation from liabil-
ity for non-negligent acts, if a carrier cannot fit within one of
the exclusions enumerated above, it would probably be con-
sidered negligent, given that it had exclusive control over the
lost or damaged baggage.t Also, as a matter of customer re-
such liability are probably best viewed as permissible modifications of the common law
rather than as economic regulation. It is conceivable, however, that such statutes could
be viewed in certain circumstances as economic regulation involving rates, routes or
services and therefore precluded by federal preemption.
- Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24 (1879); Hannibal R.R. v. Swift, 79 U.S. 262
(1870); Saunders v. Southern Ry., 128 F. 15 (6th Cir. 1904).
",, Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24 (1879); Hannibal R.R. v. Swift, 79 U.S. 262
(1870); J&H Flyer, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 316 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1963); Saunders v.
Southern Ry., 128 F. 15 (6th Cir. 1904); Zeidenberg v. Greyhound Lines, 3 Conn. Cir.
Ct. 176, 209 A.2d 697 (1965); Greenberg v. United Airlines, 98 Misc. 2d 544, 414
N.Y.S.2d 240 (Civ. Ct. 1979); Cray -,. Pennsylavania Greyhound Lines, 177 Pa. Super.
275, 110 A.2d 892 (1955).
111 See The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375 (1897); Cray v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
177 Pa. Super. 275, 110 A.2d 892 (1955); cf., Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377
U.S. 134 (1964); Ensco Inc. v. Weiker Transfer and Storage, 689 F.2d 921 (10th Cir.
1982); Marks Mfg. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 448 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1971) (cases
involving damage to goods rather than baggage). These exclusions are comparable to
those provided in the Warsaw Convention, i.e., that the carrier took "all necessary
measures" to avoid the damage or that it was "impossible" for it to take such measures.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
,,7 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S.(17 Wall.) 357 (1873); Klicker v. Northwest
Airlines, 563 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1977); Eastern Air Lines v. Williamson, 211 So. 2d
912 (Ala. 1968); Odom v. Pacific Northern Airlines, 393 P.2d 112 (Alaska 1964); Ran-
dolph v. American Airlines, 103 Ohio App. 172, 144 N.E.2d 878 (1956); Horelick v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 13 N.J. 349, 99 A.2d 652 (1953); Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial
Airways, 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935).
- See Marks Mfg. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 448 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1971). For an
analogous concept, see discussion of res ip sa loquitur in the context of personal injury or
death suits, zifra note 128 and accompanying text.
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lations, a carrier would be unlikely to exculpate itself entirely
from its liability for lost baggage, and would probably be
willing to pay at least some minimal compensation.
A common carrier may, however, hnit by contract its lia-
bility for damage to or loss of baggage.'19 Such a limit of lia-
bility for a passenger's baggage must be "fair and
reasonable," however. 120 One specific application of this rea-
sonableness requirement is the common law rule that a com-
mon carrier may not limit its liability without offering the
passenger an opportunity to choose greater protection at a
higher price.' 2' As the New York Court of Appeals has ex-
plained: "It is possible for parties to limit their liability pro-
vided that there is a voluntary choice of obtaining full or
limited liability by paying under a graduated scale of rates
proportioned to the responsibility in transportation or other
services rendered." 22
Similar to this reasonableness requirement is the require-
ment under a contract of adhesion analysis that, to withstand
scrutiny, a challenged provision must not be "unconsciona-
ble." 23 Given that air carrier contracts of carriage may be
considered contracts of adhesion, in order to be considered
valid, any limitations on baggage (or other) liability must be
.... The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375 (1897); Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24 (1879);
Saunders v. Southern Ry., 128 F. 15 (6th Cir. 1904); Zeidenberg v. Greyhound Lines, 3
Conn. Cir. Ct. 176, 209 A.2d 697 (1965); Randolph v. American Airlines, 103 Ohio
App. 172, 144 N.E.2d 878 (1956); Cray v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 177 Pa.
Super. 275, 110 A.2d 892 (1955); Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 266 N.Y. 244,
194 N.E. 692 (1935).
120 Saunders v. Southern Ry., 128 F. 15, 20 (6th Cir. 1904). See also Gas House, Inc.
v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 289 N.C. 175, 221 S.E.2d 499, 505 (1976) (a com-
mon carrier may not limit its liability if to do so is "so unreasonable as to shock the
conscience").
- See Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24 (1879); Klicker v. Northwest Airlines, 563
F. 2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1977). Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Barnes Elec. Inc., 540 F. Supp.
640 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Randolph v. American Airlines, Inc. 102 Ohio App. 172, 144
N.E. 2d 878 (1956); Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E.
692 (1935).
'2 Melodee Fine Lingerie Co. v. American District Tel. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 57, 218
N.E.2d 661, 670, 271 N.Y.S.2d 937, 946 (1966).
'1:1 Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171, 171 Cal. Rptr.
604 (1981). See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302 (court may refuse to enforce a sales
contract if "unconscionable"), which is also influential in non-sales cases. See also Al-
bert, supra note 10, at 144.
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conscionable as well as reasonable.124 This may just be saying
the same thing in a different way, as unconscionability has
been defined as "absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties together with contract terms which are un-
reasonably favorable to the other party."' 25 A valid common
law limitation of a common carrier's liability for loss of or
damage to baggage must be accompanied by effective notice
to the passenger of the limitation, as discussed below in Sec-
tion IV(C).
3. Personal Injury and Death
While an air carrier is "not an insurer of the safety of its
passengers," and its liability is based on negligence, it must
"exercise the highest degree of care consistent with the practi-
cal operation of its plane for the safety of the passengers. "126
This is a strict standard; an air carrier is "responsible for any,
even the slightest, negligence and is required to do all that
human care, vigilance and foresight reasonably can do under
given circumstances. ' 12 7 This strict standard is enforced by
the willingness of courts to infer negligence to a carrier
through res ipsa loquitur. 128
As discussed above, an air carrier, as a common carrier,
may not exculpate itself from liability for its negligence. 29
This rule applies "with special force" to the carriage of pas-
124 See, e.g., In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978),
rev'don other grounds, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). For a definition and further discus-
sion of contracts of adhesion, see infra notes 212-219 and accompanying text.
125 Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(emphasis added).
,2, Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488, 491 (8th Cir. 1959).
127 Irwin v. Pacific S.W. Airlines, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,546, 17,547 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982).
- Id. Seealso Cox v. Northeast Airlines, 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967),cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1044 (1968). Res ipsa loquitur literally means "the thing speaks for itself," and, at
least as traditionally stated, has the following elements: (1) the event normally does not
occur without someone being negligent, (2) the event is caused by an agency or instru-
mentality within the defendant's exclusive control, (3) the event must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution by the plaintiff, and (sometimes) (4) the
evidence as to what happened is more accessible to the defendant than the plaintiff. W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 213-214 (4th ed. 1971).
'- See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
1983]
52 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
sengers."3 ° Unlike the case with baggage, an air carrier may
not limit its liability for injuries caused by its negligence. Any
such limitation "is invalid," 131 even if the passenger is offered
an opportunity to purchase greater protection. 132 Given the
applicability of res ibsa loquitur, 133 it is difficult to imagine a
personal injury or death claim against an air carrier not in-
volving negligence, so, as a practical matter, air carriers are
precluded at common law from limiting their liability for
personal injury or death. 3 4
4. Oversales/Overbook'ng
(a) Fraudulent Misrepresentatzon
A confirmed airline passenger who is "bumped" from a
flight because of overbooking may have a common law right
of action against the carrier for fraudulent misrepresentation
if the carrier fails to disclose its overbooking practice. 3' The
only apparent limitation on this right of action is that it is
unavailable if the "bumped" passenger chooses to accept de-
nied boarding compensation or alternative transportation of-
fered by the carrier in accordance with CAB rules. In such a
situation, the passenger is deemed to have elected to have
foregone his common law remedies.' 36 Similarly, where the
CAB oversales/overbooking rules do not apply, if a
"bumped" passenger agrees to accept alternative transporta-
tion or compensation, that agreement may constitute a com-
,.n Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873).
Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, v. Glose, 66 F.2d 710, 713 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
290 U.S. 696 (1933).
1:12 Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935).
1:1:1 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
,14 With the elimination of tariffs, carriers may, however, be able to limit the time in
which a suit may be brought. See Albert, supra note 10, at 134-37.
1:1° Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290 (1976); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,
626 F. 2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Roman v. Delta Air Lines, 441 F. Supp. 1160 (N.D.
Il1. 1977).
.... Christensen v. Northwest Airlines, 633 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980); Wasserman v.
Trans World Airines, 632 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1980); Roman v. Delta Air Lines, 441 F.
Supp. 1160 (N.D. Il. 1977). The CAB rules in this area protect a passenger's right to
reject denied boarding compensation. See 14 C.F.R. § 250.9 (1982), amended, 47 Fed.
Reg. 52980 (1982). See also Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
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mon law waiver of his or her right to sue for fraudulent
misrepresentation. 137
Assuming that there has been no bar or waiver, a plaintiff
in an overbooking/fraudulent misrepresentation case must
show the following: (1) a false representation, (2) in reference
to a material fact, (3) made with knowledge of its falsity, (4)
made with intent to deceive, and (5) with action taken in reli-
ance on it. 138
In the most prominent case in this area, Nader v. Allegheny
Airhhes, 13  Allegheny bumped Ralph Nader from a con-
firmed flight and Nader sued Allegheny for failing to disclose
its overbooking policies. The district court held that Nader
had proven all five elements of fraudulent misrepresentation,
and that Allegheny was therefore liable.14 ° Its basic theory
was that Allegheny's nondisclosure of its overbooking prac-
tice was misleading and created a false understanding of Na-
der's chance, as a confirmed passenger, of being flown on the
particular flight in question, and that this nondisclosure con-
stituted a false representation. 141
The court of appeals did not dispute the district court's
holding that Allegheny had made a false representation in
reference to a material fact and with knowledge of its falsity.
Indeed, the court referred specifically to the district court's
opinion in noting as follows: "[C]onfirmation of a reservation
connotes a guarantee of flight subject only to contingencies
beyond the control of the airline. The possibility of being
bumped because of overbooking is a factor within the air-
line's control."' 142  The court of appeals did, however, disa-
See Bissett v. Ply-Germ Industries, 533 F.2d 142, 151 (5th Cir. 1967) (the right to
an action for fraudulent misrepresentation arising out of a contractual setting is waived
by a new agreement made with actual or imputed knowledge of the facts constituting
the alleged fraud).
':1 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 626 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
I 9d.
, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 445 F. Supp. 168, 174-175 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 626
F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
,,, Id. at 174. The court noted that "defendant at no time (not in his tariffs, advertis-
ing, or other communications to the public) communicated to the plaintiff the exist-
ence of its overbooking practice." Id. at 168.
2 626 F.2d at 1036.
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gree with the district court as to intent to deceive and
reliance, and reversed on these grounds. It held that Alle-
gheny lacked intent to deceive because overbooking had been
considered in CAB regulatory proceedings and was generally
known to exist by the public. 143 It also held that Nader, as an
"extraordinarily knowledgable passenger," knew that a con-
firmed reservation did not exclude the possibility of being
bumped, and therefore had not relied on Allegheny's lack of
disclosure. 144
The easiest and most painless way to avoid common law
liability for fraudulent misrepresentation would be if carriers
could be assured that their present overbooking practices fall
within the Nader holding of non-liability. There are three rea-
sons, however, why carriers cannot be confident of fitting
within the Nader holding. First, the average bumped passen-
ger is not "extraordinarily knowledgeable" like Nader. Most
bumped passengers probably will be able to prove reliance on
a carrier's statement of confirmation and nondisclosure of
overbooking. Second, the court of appeals in Nader rested its
conclusion that Allegheny had no intent to deceive in part on
the fact that overbooking had been considered in CAB regu-
latory proceedings. Given deregulation, carriers may now be
less able to point to similar regulatory proceedings as a bar to
their deceptive intent. In the absence of such proceedings,
lack of intent to deceive will be more difficult to show. Fi-
nally, it is far from clear that a carrier will be able to escape
liability solely on the basis of lack of intent inferred from gen-
eral public knowledge of overbooking, the final Nader reason
for non-liability. In the absence of regulatory proceedings,
this knowledge may be reduced. Furthermore, it is concep-
tually unclear why public knowledge vitiates intent. Public
knowledge more properly goes to the question of reasonable
reliance, and the court of appeals implied that reliance would
be reasonable for passengers who were not extraordinarily
well-informed.
This is not to say that carriers will be automatically liable
- Id. at 1037.
144 Id.
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for fraudulent misrepresentation under Nader if they
overbook and then bump passengers. Rather, it is to suggest
that carriers are not securely protected from such liability un-
less they take preventive steps. The element of fraudulent
misrepresentation over which carriers have the most control
is whether they make a false representation. If carriers en-
gage in overbooking, there are two basic approaches for carri-
ers to prevent charges of false representation; they may refuse
to make confirmed reservations, or they may disclose
overbooking practices. The basic theory of a fraudulent mis-
representation/overbooking suit is that a confirmed reserva-
tion, in the absence of any additional information, suggests a
guaranteed seat.'45 Thus, if there is no confirmed reservation,
there is no guaranteed seat and, hence, no misrepresentation
if a seat is not provided.
Because many carriers may want to continue overbooking
and oversales practices, the preferable method of avoiding
fraudulent misrepresentation liability for most carriers is dis-
closure of overbooking practices. There can be no fraudulent
misrepresentation if there is adequate disclosure, for there is
no false representation. What constitutes adequate disclosure
at common law is discussed below in Section IV(C).
(b) Breach of Contract
A passenger bumped from a flight because of overbooking
may also sue the carrier for breach of the contract of carriage,
again assuming he does not accept denied boarding compen-
sation."' The theory of such a breach of contract suit, while
not explicitly developed by the courts, is simple. By confirm-
ing a passenger's reservation, a carrier contracts to carry that
passenger; by not honoring the confirmed reservation because
of overbooking, the carrier breaches the contract of carriage
and is therefore liable.
See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290 (1976); Nader v. Allegheny Air.-
lines, 626 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Note, Federal Preemption ofState Law.: The Example
of Oerbooking in the Airline Indusqt, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1200 (1976).
-; See Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Kalish v.
Trans World Airlines, 50 Ohio St. 2d 73, 362 N.E.2d 994 (1977). See also Crowley v.
S.S. Arcadia, 244 F. Supp. 597 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (involving a ship passenger).
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If a carrier makes the requisite disclosure of its overbooking
practices so as to avoid liability for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion, it should also be able to avoid liability for breach of
contract. Once adequate disclosure of overbooking practices
is made, the contract of carriage is subject to those disclosed
practices (i.e., the contract is to carry the passenger only if he
is not bumped in accordance with overbooking practices),
and there should be no danger of a successful breach of con-
tract suit.
5. Fh'ght Delays and Cancellations
There have been a limited number of cases dealing, at least
in part, with an air carrier's liability at common law for flight
delays or cancellation."'
In one recent case, the court held a carrier liable for breach
of its contract to fly the plaintiffs non-stop to their destination
when it made an unscheduled stop to pick up passengers that
the carrier had not been able to pick up on an earlier leg of
the flight due to bad weather. 48  Another recent case, in
which an air carrier had cancelled a flight because the plane
was diverted (to fly another route for which the scheduled
plane had broken down), suggested, while denying recovery,
that in the absence of a tariff provision limiting liability, a
passenger on the cancelled flight may have had a common
law right of action against the air carrier for breach of its
duty as a common carrier. 149 Other cases have suggested,
while also denying recovery, that in the absence of exculpa-
tory provisions a carrier may be liable for breach of contract
for omitting a scheduled stop,' 50 adding an unscheduled
stop,151 or cancelling a flight altogether.'
52
"I See Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, 541 F. Supp. 1338 (W.D. Pa. 1982);
Amon v. Eastern Airlines, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,919 (D. Or. 1981); Kutner v. Eastern
Airlines, 514 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Schaefer v. National Airlines, 16 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 18,405 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Levy v. American Express, 274 So. 2d 857 (La. Ct.
App.), affd, 287 So. 2d 784 (La. 1973).
" Vick v. National Airlines., 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,405 (La. App. 1982).
; See Schaefer v. National Airlines, 499 F. Supp. 920 (D. Md. 1980).
', Amon v. Eastern Airlines, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,919 (D. Or. 1981).
Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, 541 F. Supp. 1338 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
152 Kutner v. Eastern Airlines, 514 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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These cases suggest that a carrier may avoid or limit its
liability for these sorts of harms through proper notice.' 5 Ef-
fective common law notice, discussed below in Section IV(C),
would not only make the liability limitation part of the con-
tract and preclude breach of contract suits, but should also





The CAB's new part 254,1 55 if it takes effect as originally
promulgated, 156 will require each carrier using aircraft of
more than 60 seats to provide notice to passengers, "by writ-
ten material included on or with its tickets," of any limita-
tions on its baggage liability, including rules for fragile and
perishable goods, and of the availability of excess valuation
insurance coverage, if provided by the carrier. 157 It is not
clear whether this notice requirement will mean that those
carriers to which it applies must actually describe the sub-
stance of their limitations or merely state that they exist. 58
The CAB has proposed amending part 254's baggage notice
requirement to require specific notice on or with each ticket
of a carrier's baggage liability limitations. 15' The ticket
would be required to state either the carrier's actual mone-
tary baggage liability limitation or include the following
statement: "Federal rules require any limit on an airline's
baggage liability to be at least $1000 per passenger, except for
M See, e.g., Brunwasser, 541 F. Supp. at 1341 ("the terms of this contract of carriage
are set forth in writing on the ticket. . . .The terms of the agreement are clear and
unambiguous."); Vick, 16 Av. Cas. at 18,406 ("[d]efendant's failure was [in part] in not
adequately informing plaintiffs of the changed flight schedule.
See supra notes 135-145 and accompanying text for a discussion of misrepresenta-
tion suits in the context of oversales/overbooking.
47 Fed. Reg. 52,987 (1982).
"" As discussed supra note 32 and accompanying text, the CAB has stayed imple-
mentation of the new baggage rules. See 48 Fed. Reg. 6,698 (1983).
,57 47 Fed. Reg. 52,987, 52,991 (1982).
- CAB staff informally advises that the rule does not require that substantive terms
be stated but notes that, under state law, such a course may be preferable or required.
,, 48 Fed. Reg. 22,323 (1983).
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flights on small aircraft where lower limits may apply. Air-
lines may have higher limits." 160 The CAB has also proposed
amending part 253161 to require that if carriers incorporate
terms of carriage by reference, they must give passengers no-
tice that such incorporated terms may include limits on bag-
gage liability, including those for fragile or perishable items,
and of the availability of excess valuation insurance. 162 Be-
cause, in reliance on the new part 254, the CAB amended its
tariff rules to eliminate requirements that carriers provide no-
tice of domestic baggage liability limitations, 63 technically
there are currently no CAB domestic baggage notice require-
ments applicable to certificated carriers. Section 298.30 of
the CAB Regulations requires, however, that non-certifi-
cated carriers operating aircraft of 60 seats or less "cause to
be displayed continuously in a conspicuous public place"
wherever its employees sell its tickets a "clearly visible and
readable" sign setting forth its baggage liability policy. 164
Thus, ironically, non-certificated smaller carriers are subject
to CAB regulation in an area in which, at least in the short
run, larger certificated carriers are not.
2. Oversales/Overbooking
Part 250 of the CAB Regulations requires carriers using
aircraft of more than 60 seats to provide two types of notice of
their overbooking/oversales policies. 65 First, they must cause
to be displayed continuously wherever their tickets are sold a
sign for passengers, as set forth below, in bold-face type at
least one-fourth of an inch high. The sign must be in a "con-
- Id. at 22,324. Presumably the $1000 figure would be changed to $1250 if that is
the minimum liability limit adopted by the CAB. See supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
" 47 Fed. Reg. 52,128 (1982). See discussion of part 153, infra Section IV(A)(4) at
notes 155-164.
"; 48 Fed. Reg. 22,323 (1983).
163 48 Fed. Reg. 227 (1983), corrected, 48 Fed. Reg. 3584 (1983) (amending 14 C.F.R.
§ 221.176 (1982)).
1- 14 C.F.R. § 298.30 (1982). Certificated carriers operating aircraft of 60 seats or
less are exempted from this requirement by 14 C.F.R. § 298.95(b)(1982). Those carriers
are also not covered by the new part 254.
... 47 Fed. Reg. 52,980 (1982) (modifying 14 C.F.R. § 250 (1982)).
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spicuous public place," and must be located so as to be
"clearly visible and clearly readable to the traveling pub-
lic."'1 66 The sign must read as follows:
Notice-Overbooking of Flights
Airline flights may be overbooked, and there is a slight
chance that a seat will not be available on a flight for which a
person has a reservation. If the flight is overbooked, no one
will be denied a seat until airline personnel first ask for volun-
teers willing to give up their reservation in exchange for a
payment of the airline's choosing. If there are not enough vol-
unteers the airline will deny boarding to other persons in ac-
cordance with its particular boarding priority. With few
exceptions persons denied boarding involuntarily are entitled
to compensation. The complete rules for payment of compen-
sation and each airline's boarding priorities are available at
all airport ticket counters and boarding locations. "'
Second, carriers covered by part 250 must include this
same notice "with each ticket sold in the United States.'
' 68
The notice must be printed in at least 12-point type, and its
last two sentences must be printed in a typeface contrasting
with that used on the rest of the notice. 1
69
Section 298.30 of the CAB Regulations require that non-
certified carriers operating aircraft of 60 seats or less "cause to
be displayed continuously in a conspicuous public place"
wherever its employees sell its tickets a "clearly visible and
readable" sign setting forth its denied boarding compensation
policy. 70
3. Smoking
The CAB's current smoking rules do not require that any
notice be provided.' 7 ' The Board recently proposed, how-




.. 14 C.F.R. § 298.30 (1982). By virtue of 14 C.F.R. § 298.95(b)(1982), this require-
ment does not apply to certificated operators of aircraft of 60 seats or less. These carri-
ers are also not subject to part 250, so they are not subject to any notice requirements
with respect to their denied boarding policies.
, 14 C.F.R. § 252 (1982).
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ever, that carriers using aircraft of more than 30 seats be re-
quired to provide the following notice "on or with" their
tickets: "Every passenger who meets the airline's check-in re-
quirements has a right to a seat in a non-smoking section."'' 72
Alternatively, the Board proposed that smoking rules be ad-
ded to the terms and conditions covered by the new part 253
on Notice of Terms of Contract of Carriage, discussed
below. '73
4. General Notice of Terms of Contract of Carriage
Until January 1, 1983,171 carriers using aircraft of more
than sixty seats were able to incorporate terms and conditions
of carriage through tariffs. Without CAB action, on January
1, 1983, all carriers would have been subject to the laws of the
various states regarding (a) whether they can incorporate
terms and conditions by reference to documents other than a
passenger's ticket (i.e., to a separate set of terms and condi-
tions) and (b) the notice that must accompany any such in-
corporated terms and conditions. 75
To deal with this situation and prevent the applicability of
disparate state laws, the Board adopted rules permitting in-
corporation by reference provided that uniform federal notice
and other newly-established requirements are followed. 176
The Board's new incorporation by reference and notice rules
originally applied only to scheduled direct air carrier opera-
tions in interstate or overseas (i.e., within United States terri-
tory) air transportation involving aircraft designed to have a
,12 47 Fed. Reg. 52,190 (1982).
17. Id.
- 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2)(1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (repealing 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980)).
M, As stated by the Board:
[I]n the absence of general [CAB] rules on the subject, it is likely that
courts acting on passenger claims would either deny altogether the valid-
ity of any contract terms of which the passenger did not have direct
notice, or lay down differing rules for their incorporation by reference.
Such rules would probably require a higher degree of notice than had
been provided by the tariff system. The question of notice might also be
subject to State legislative attention.
48 Fed. Reg. 6,317 (1983) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 253).
" 47 Fed. Reg. 52,128 (1982) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 253).
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maximum passenger capacity of more than 60 seats, as well
as to passengers on flight segments that are included on the
same ticket with segments involving such large aircraft, re-
gardless of aircraft size or the identity of the carrier.177 The
Board subsequently extended the rules to cover all scheduled
direct air carrier operations in interstate or overseas air
transportation. 17
Under part 253, if a carrier chooses to incorporate contract
terms by reference to other documents, it is required to do the
following: (a) make the full text of each incorporated term
available at each of its airport and city ticket offices (but not
at travel agencies); (b) provide, upon the request of passen-
gers, a free copy of the text of its incorporated terms, either
by mail or "other delivery service"; (c) ensure that all loca-
tions within the United States where its tickets are sold, in-
cluding travel agencies, have available free information
sufficient to enable passengers to order the full text of incor-
porated terms; (d) ensure that any passenger can obtain from
any location where a carrier's tickets are sold within the
United States, including travel agencies, a "concise and im-
mediate" explanation of the specified terms described below
which the carrier has incorporated by reference;179 and (e)
provide notice on or with the ticket as described below.' °
Carriers incorporating contract terms by reference must in-
clude on or with the ticket (or other written instrument given
to a passenger which embodies the contract of carriage and
incorporates terms by reference) "conspicuous written notice"
of the following: (a) that any terms incorporated by reference
are part of the contract; (b) that passengers may inspect the
full text of each incorporated term at the carrier's airport or
city ticket office; (c) that passengers have the right, upon re-
177 Id.
,,, 48 Fed. Reg. 6,317 (1983).
, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,128 (1982). To meet this requirement, the Air Traffic Conference
of America has begun publishing a periodic summary of carriers' incorporated terms
and conditions. See, e.g., AIR TRAFFIC CONFERENCE OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES
AIR CARRIERS CONDITION OF CONTRACT SUMMARY OF INCORPORATED TERMS (Do-
MESTIC AIR TRANSPORTATION) (February, 1983).
'' 47 Fed. Reg. 52,128 (1982).
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quest at any location within the United States where the car-
rier's tickets are sold, to receive by mail or other delivery
service the full text of each incorporated term; (d) that incor-
porated terms may include certain specified subjects, de-
scribed below; and (e) that passengers may obtain from any
location where the carrier's tickets are sold within the United
States further information about those specified subjects.'
The specified subjects about which passengers have to be
notified that incorporated terms may exist1s 2 are the follow-
ing: (a) limits of liability for personal injury or death; (b)
claim restrictions, including time periods within which pas-
sengers must file a claim or bring an action against the carrier
for its acts or omissions or those of its agents; (c) rights of the
carrier to change non-price terms of the contract; (d) rules
about reconfirmation of reservations, check-in times, and re-
fusal to carry; and (e) rights of the carrier and limitations
concerning delay or failure to perform service, including
schedule changes, substitution of alternate air carrier or air-
craft and rerouting. 183
The new rules also require actual notice of certain fare-
related terms. A passenger will not be bound by any terms
restricting refunds of the ticket price, imposing monetary
penalties on passengers, or permitting the carrier to raise the
price, unless the passenger "receives conspicuous written no-
tice" of the "salient" features of those terms on or with the
ticket.' 8 4 Except for these limited actual notice areas, the new
rules do not require carriers to provide substantive informa-
tion on or with the ticket of any of their incorporated terms
or conditions.
The CAB has not elaborated on what constitutes "conspic-
uous" notice. Instead, in adopting the new part 253, it stated
8 Id. at 52,135.
a2 The CAB assumes that this notice "can and presumably will" be standardized.
Id. at 52,132. The Air Traffic Conference of America has developed such a standard
"Notice of Incorporated Terms" for use on ticket stock.
- Id. at 52,135. The CAB has proposed that limits on baggage liability, including
those for fragile or perishable items, and the availability of excess valuation insurance
be added to this list. 48 Fed. Reg. 22,323 (1983).
'"4 Id.
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that courts will "have an important role to play in determin-
ing whether the notice given was 'conspicuous.' " 185 In de-
termining what constitutes conspicuous notice for purposes of
the CAB rules, courts are likely to follow the common law
requirement that in order for notice of common carriers'
terms and conditions to be deemed sufficient to make those
terms and conditions binding, the terms and conditions in
question must be "distinctly declared," "distinctly brought
to the knowledge of the passenger," or "plainly declared.' 6
Two caveats to these rules should be stressed. First, the
rules are not mandatory. They apply only to carriers that
choose to incorporate by reference terms that are not a part
of the documents given to passengers. As the CAB has em-
phasized (in the context of small carriers, but applicable to
large carriers as well): "[T]he upshot . . .is that there is no
necessity for them to comply with the notice requirements of
part 253 . . . .If they do not, the terms of their contracts
with passengers will be simply those stated on the ticket."'' 8 7
Second, the new part 253 does not preempt or otherwise
affect the role of state common or statutory law in governing
the substantive terms of carriers' contracts of carriage. As the
CAB explained in adop'ting the new rules, the courts will
have an "important role" in determining whether any "term
itself is proper.' ' 88 Thus, even if a court concludes that CAB
notice requirements were met, it could still find the carrier
fully liable on the basis that the limitation involved was sub-
stantively unreasonable or unconscionable or otherwise con-
trary to law.
-- Id. at 52,132.
!-The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375, 386 (1897); Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24, 29-
301(1879); Saunders v. Southern Ry. 128 F. 15, 20 (6th Cir. 1904). See infta notes 205-
220 and accompanying text for a discussion of common law notice requirements.
W 48 Fed Reg. 6,317 (1983). See also id at 6318 ("[t]he rule is only permissive, offer-
ing carriers a method of incorporating terms by reference if they choose to do so").
The Board has proposed amending part 253 to make its permissive nature, at least
with respect to small carriers, even more explicit. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,707 (1983).
- 47 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (1982).
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B. Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement
1. Baggage
In order to take advantage of the baggage liability limita-
tion provisions of the Warsaw Convention, 8 9 carriers operat-
ing in international travel or on domestic segments of an
international journey must provide the passenger with a bag-
gage check that, ziter aia, states the number of the passenger
ticket, the number and weight of the packages (i.e., items of
baggage) being transported, and a statement that the trans-
portation of the baggage is subject to the liability rules of the
Convention. "
The CAB has adopted notice requirements giving these
baggage liability provisions "substantive effect. '"19 ' Section
221.176 of the Board's Regulations prescribes specified ticket
and sign notices. 192 The ticket notice must be printed in at
least 10-point type. 9 ' If the notice is printed in smaller type
(e.g., 8.5-point), the carrier may not avail itself of the applica-
ble liability limits. 94 The sign notice must be placed in a
"conspicuous public place" wherever in the United States the
carrier's tickets are sold or it accepts baggage for checking.' 95
2. Injury or Death
In order to take advantage of the personal injury and
death liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the
Montreal Agreement, carriers must provide the passenger
with a ticket that includes, inter a/a, a statement that the
transportation is subject to the liability rules of the Conven-
tion.' The ticket must be "delivered to the passenger in
. 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1976).
Convention, supra note 56, art. 4.
' Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. CAB, 479 F.2d 912, 918 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
- 14 C.F.R. § 221.176 (1982), amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 227 (1983), corrected, 48 Fed.
Reg. 3,584 (1983).
1 Id.
19- Cf In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(involving suit for wrongful death under the Montreal Agreement).
14 C.F.R. § 221.176.
'' Convention, supra note 56, art. 3.
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such a manner as to afford him reasonable opportunity to
take protective measures"; otherwise the liability limitations
will not apply.' 97 Under the Montreal Agreement carriers
must also provide notice in 10-point type of liability limita-
tions at the time tickets are delivered.'9 Notice printed in
smaller type (e.g., 8.5-point) will not do.' 99 CAB tariff rules
require that carriers covered by the Montreal Agreement pro-
vide a specified notice in writing to each passenger, whose
transportation is governed by the Agreement and whose
place of departure or destination is the United States.20 0 The
notice must be in at least 10-point modern type and in ink
contrasting with the stock. It must also be printed either on
each ticket or on a piece of paper placed in the ticket envel-
ope, or must be attached to the ticket or the ticket envelope.
Additionally, it must be "displayed continuously in a con-
spicuous public place" wherever tickets are sold in the United
States involving transportation governed by the Warsaw
Conventi on and at the place of departure or destination in
the United States. 20' These signs must be printed in bold-
faced type at least one-fourth of an inch high. 21 2 In addition,
the CAB requires that carriers include the Montreal Agree-
ment in their contracts of carriage. 20 3 These CAB notice re-
quirements give "substantive effect" to the notice provisions
of the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement. 0 4
C. Common Law
Under the common law, for a clause limiting an air car-
Lisi v. Atlitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508, 513 (2d Cir. 1966), aft'd, 390
U.S. 455 (1968), rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968).
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BD., supra note 72.
In re Aircrash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y 1982).
14 C.F.R. § 221.175 (1982), amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 227 (1983), corrected, 48 Fed.
Reg. 3,584 (1983). See also 48 Fed. Reg. 8,042 (1983) (new part 203 of CAB
Regulations).
- I Id.
2 Id. An alternative sign providing notice of liability limitations with respect to
both baggage and personal injury and death is provided in section 221.176 of the
Board's Regulations. See supra note 192.
-" 48 Fed. Reg. 8,042 (1983).
See Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. CAB, 479 F.2d 912, 918 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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rier's liability to be valid, passengers must be notified in such
a fashion that they can be deemed to have knowingly agreed
to the limitation. In an early steamship case, for example, the
Supreme Court held that a passenger was not bound by a
limitation of liability for baggage printed on the back of his
ticket, even though "SEE BACK" was printed in bold face
type on the front of the ticket, because the limitation had not
been "dzst'ncty declared and dehberatel accepted"2 °5
More recent ship cases have also stressed the importance of
adequate notice of liability limitations. 20 6 A recent review of
such cases by the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York suggests that it is not enough that
the contract of carriage (i.e., ticket) include a statement of the
liability limitation imposed by the carrier. The court rea-
soned that "[E]ven if the condition appears in the body of
the contract, a court should nevertheless inquire whether the
reader's attention was called to the fine pritt.' 207 The court stated
that notice would be sufficient where there is a warning to
read the ticket's conditions that is in a "conspicuous location
on the ticket cover" and printed in white lettering set off
against a blue background.0°
Apart from location of the notice, a carrier must be careful
that the substance of the liability limitation is itself expressed
in clear and understandable terms: "[A] passenger would not
be bound by a provision written so lutulently [obscurely] and
printed in such small type as to be virtually
incomprehensible."20 9
-, The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375, 386 (1897) (emphasis added). Early common law
railroad cases took a similar approach. One court stated, "When a carrier desires to
limit its common law responsibility, there is nothing unreasonable in requiring that the
extent of the exoneration shall be plainly declared and brought to the attention of its customer in
such way as to afford opportum'ty for acceptance or rejection." Saunders v. Southern Ry., 128 F.
15, 20 (6th Cir. 1904) (emphasis added). See also Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24,
29-30 (1879) (a limitation of baggage liability must be "distinctly brought to the
knowledge of the passenger").
- See, e.g., DeNicola v. Cunard Line Ltd., 642 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981); Raskin v.
Compania de Vapores Realma, S.P., 521 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Raskin, 521 F. Supp. at 340 (emphasis added).
Id. at 341 (citing McQuillan v. Italia Societa Per Azione Di Navigazione, 386 F.
Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afd, 516 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1975)).
Id. at 340-41 (interior quotation marks omitted).
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Courts applying the notice requirements of the Warsaw
Convention have also stressed the importance of the passen-
ger being able to understand the notice, in addition to the
notice itself being conspicuous. 2'0 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has provided, in that con-
text, a good description of how a carrier should not attempt
to fulfill its common law notice obligations:
[T]he exculpatory statements on which defendant relies are
virtually invisible. They are ineffectively positioned, diminu-
tively sized, and unemphasized by bold face type, contrasting
color, or anything else. The simple truth is that they are so
artfully camoflauged that their presence is concealed. More-
over, even if a passenger were able to read the printing on the
ticket and baggage check, it is highly questionable whether he
would be able to understand the meaning of the language
contained thereon. 21
In addition to this general body of case law, notice require-
ments may be imposed under a contract of adhesion analysis.
A contract of adhesion is a standardized contract, drafted
and imposed by a party of superior bargaining power, which
relegates to the subscribing party the opportunity to adhere
to the contract or reject it. 2 12 In addition, an adhesion con-
tract generally involves services that cannot readily be ob-
tained elsewhere.21 3
Over a century ago, the Supreme Court approached rail
carrier contracts in a fashion that today would be considered
contract of adhesion analysis, 21 4 and modern courts could eas-
ily categorize limitation of liability provisions in air carrier
contracts with passengers as similarly adhesive. Air carriers
210 See, e.g., Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), afd,
390 U.S. 455 (1968), rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968).
v, Id. at 514. Compare Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1338,
1341 (N.D. Pa. 1982) (contractual terms as set forth in the ticket were "clear and
unambiguous").
212 Graham v. Scissor-Tail, 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981).
For a discussion of adhesion contracts generally, see Albert, supra note 10 at 137-139.
2'3 Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 ( Col. 1981).
214 In striking down exculpatory contract provisions, the Supreme Court referred,
inter aha, to "the inequality of the parties, [and] the compulsion under which the cus-
tomer is placed . . . " Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 381 (1873).
19831
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essentially impose standardized clauses on passengers who
have no effective choice or bargaining opportunity, in a con-
text involving a service ,hat cannot readily be obtained else-
where (assuming all or most carriers follow the same or
similar limitation of liability policies or that their schedules
differ substantially). Indeed, at least in the context of the
Warsaw Convention, courts have "treat[ed] the airline pas-
senger ticket, absent effective notice of liability limitations, as
a contract of adhesion. ' 215 With air carrier contracts made in
a deregulated common law environment, there is no barrier
to courts applying the adhesion contract doctrine more
generally.
The fact that air carrier limitation of liability clauses might
constitute contracts of adhesion does not necessarily make
them invalid.2 16 Rather, the contract (or provision) will not
be enforced if, as discussed above in Section III(c)(2), it is
"unconscionable, 2 17 or, more relevant to the discussion here,
is "not within the reasonable expectations of the weaker or
'adhering' party. '218 While this latter requirement involves
more than notice, notice is a key factor in deciding whether
an adhesive provision should be enforced. One court stated
that "provisions contrary to the reasonable expectations of
the adhering party will be denied enforcement in the absence
of platn and clear notifation and an understandtng consent . ' 219 A
passenger thus cannot reasonably be deemed to have given
his or her "understanding consent" to a limitation of liability
or other contract term if the contract itself (i.e., the ticket and
accompanying documents) merely refers to the existence of
such a limitation or term rather than providing some "plain
and clear notification" of the substance of the limitation or
term at issue.
215 In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1120 (D.C. Cal. 1978), revd
on other grounds, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
'21 See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, 28 Cal. 3d 807, 849, 623 P.2d 165, 171, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 604 (1981).
21, For a definition of unconscionable, see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
2 a Graham, 28 Cal 3d at 820, 633 P.2d at 172, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
211 Id. at 821 n.18, 623 P.2d at 173, n.18, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 614 n.18. (emphasis
added; interior quotation marks omitted).
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Under this vast body of law, one cannot state precisely
what will constitute adequate or inadequate disclosure of air
carrier liability limitations at common law. The general prin-
ciple is clear, however. The passenger should be given on or
with his ticket or baggage claim check a conspicuous and
clear explanation of the carrier's liability limitation policies.
In order to enforce baggage liability limitations, a carrier
must also provide passengers with "a fair opportunity to
choose between a higher or lower liability by declaring a cor-
respondingly greater or lesser value.
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V. CONCLUSION
As of January 1, 1983, the world of commercial air carriers
changed dramatically. Air carriers are now no longer able to
protect themselves from liability to their domestic passengers
by filing tariffs with the Civil Aeronautics Board. 22 The
elimination of domestic tariffs is likely to encourage an in-
crease in court claims by passengers against carriers and
probably an increase in carrier liability as well, at least in the
short run or until carriers adapt to the new environment.
While, in a variety of areas, carriers' substantive liability
and notice responsibilities continue to be governed by federal
regulation and treaties, carriers are now more exposed to the
generally greater liability and stricter notice requirements of
the common law. The common law will also play an impor-
tant role as courts interpret and enforce regulatory and treaty
law, especially given some of the uncertainties discussed in
this article.2
22
Despite the variety of sources of law to which carriers now
have to be responsive, there is one unifying theme - notice.
If carriers properly notify passengers of their terms and condi-
tions of carriage, the carriers should be able reasonably to
limit their liability. Whether carriers will conscientiously pro-
2- Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Barnes Elec., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 640, 645 (N.D. Ind.
1982). See also Klicker v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 563 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1977).
' 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2)(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2 See, e.g.,supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text for discussion of enforceability
of Warsaw Convention.
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vide such notice is far from clear at this time. 23
-1 See, .g., Aviation Consumer Action Project v. American Airlines, CAB Docket
No. 41399 (filed March 30, 1983). The CAB alleged that twelve major carriers were
not complying with the Board's new general contract of carriage notice requirements.
The carriers involved were American Airlines, Delta Airlines, Eastern Airlines, New
York Air, Northwest Orient Airlines, US Air, Western Airlines, and World Airways. Id.
After considering the complaint, the carriers' responses, and conducting a survey of its
own, the Board dismissed the complaint with respect to seven of the carriers and
agreed to accept a compromise civil penalty for apparent violations by five of the carri-
ers. CAB Order 83-7-31 (Enf. Div. July 11, 1983). In addition, the Board conducted
an investigation of its own and found that two other carriers were not in compliance
and agreed to accept a compromise civil penalty from these carriers as well. Id. The
Board also stressed that carriers would be held to a "high standard of compliance"
with part 253 if they incorporate by reference because, if "loosely enforced," part 253
"would create the very result it was designed to prevent: unconscionable contracts of
adhesion." Id.
